Assurance funding
Software, research, events, local infrastructure, or public goods that only get funded once a pledge threshold is reached.
App concept
A coordination market only pays out once enough strangers commit to the same condition. Kaspa's fast mined ordering gives the design a shared, checkable record, and Toccata's covenant rules can enforce a threshold release on L1.
Status: the L1 pieces are live; the market is not. No wallet flow, tooling, or app receipts exist yet for a real coordination market.
A user commits funds. The app groups that commitment with others aiming at the same condition. A public rule checks whether the condition is met. Funds release or refund based on that check, visible to anyone replaying the chain.
That much is buildable with public, replayable logic. Privacy before the threshold is hit, reusable capital, solver incentives, and oracle markets remain unsolved design problems.
Software, research, events, local infrastructure, or public goods that only get funded once a pledge threshold is reached.
A prize releases when objective evidence or judge approval satisfies a rule that was published before the work started.
Compute, data, access, or service capacity allocated through commitments anyone can check, unlike a sealed order book.
Deposits, machine-checkable completion proofs, release/refund paths, and evidence for disputes between agents.
| Open problem | Question before launch | Status lane |
|---|---|---|
| External facts | Who supplies the price, event outcome, proof, or judge decision the contract checks against? | Research |
| Settlement rule | What exact condition releases funds, and what exact condition refunds them? | Targeted |
| Wallet UX | Can a user read the condition they're signing before they sign it? | Live foundation |
| Privacy | Can a commitment stay hidden until the threshold is actually reached? | Research |